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on a productivity-enhancing agenda. An opportunity-cost argument implies that long-term gains from R&D and innovation have priority over short-term investments during a recession.
The countercyclical nature of innovation is an appealing concept. Evening out some of the cyclical volatility enables an economy to navigate toward a less erratic growth path. However, the countercyclicality argument for long-term productivity-enhancing investments will apply only as long as firms' fund raising is not limited. This is hardly the case whenever a firm is hit by an adverse shock, whether idiosyncratic or aggregate. A negative shock reduces a firm's current earnings, depleting internal funds and undermining its capacity to borrow or raise external funds. The extent to which credit constraints bind is strongly dependent on the cyclical phase.
The aim of the current paper is to investigate the impact of demand fluctuations and credit frictions on the likelihood of a firm undertaking R&D. We seek evidence from new member countries of the European Union in Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe (CSEE) that have low business-sector R&D expenditures and underdeveloped venture capital markets. CSEE countries have been facing problems in building up their national innovation systems in the narrow sense (i.e., the institutions directly related to R&D and resources allocated to R&D; see Freeman 2006) . There have been various explanations for the low R&D activity in these countries. Kravtsova and Radosevic (2012) find that CSEE firms are inefficient in turning R&D and innovation into productivity growth. Meriküll et al. (2012) find that some part of the lower R&D expenditures of CSEE countries is explained by their industry structure, which relies to a greater extent on low-tech industries. Brown et al. (2011) find that there are more discouraged firms in Eastern than in Western European credit markets, and that credit-constrained firms in Eastern Europe are less likely to invest in R&D. This paper contributes to this literature by investigating whether the business cycle also has played a role in explaining low R&D activity in CSEE countries.
We estimate recursive bivariate probit models that account for the simultaneous decision of firms on whether to undertake R&D depending on their perceived credit constraints. We make use of the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted by the European Bank for Research and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. The data set consists of three cross-sections from 2001, 2004, and 2007 , and covers up to 9,500 firms in ten new EU member states from CSEE. We pool the data sets and estimate the effect of a cycle based on cross-sectional variation.
Literature
The seminal model of Aghion et al. (2005) and Aghion et al. (2010) et al. (2010) , however, claim that given credit constraints, long-term investments become procyclical. The model of Aghion et al. (2005 Aghion et al. ( , 2010 identifies a propagating mechanism that credit constraints have on the cyclical composition of investment. In particular, there is a wedge that reflects the probability of failure determined by the allocation of investments between the short and long runs. This wedge is countercyclical, decreasing in booms and increasing in recessions. A negative shock will leave firms short of internal resources and will limit their access to external funds, so the probability of failure increases and the shift from long-term to short-term investment improves the liquidity available over the next period. Barlevy (2007) proposes an opposing theory, claiming that R&D expenditures behave in a procyclical manner, contrary to the opportunity-cost argument. In his model, "the bigger the ratio of profits in booms to their value in recessions . . . , the more R&D will be biased towards boom" (Barlevy 2007 (Barlevy : 1146 . For this to be true requires that profits be more procyclical than the cost of R&D. He also shows that industries with more procyclical profits, as proxied by stock values, tend to have more procyclical R&D.
The empirical evidence has not given consistent support to either of the R&D cyclicality arguments. From a study of long-term relationships in U.S. aggregate data, Rafferty (2003) demonstrates procyclical and asymmetric patterns of firm-financed R&D. He claims that increased after-tax cash flows raise R&D expenditures and that more R&D has been lost during recessions than has been gained during expansions, with business cycles having a negative net effect on aggregate R&D. The evidence from a panel of twenty U.S. manufacturing industries by Ouyang (2007) indicates a more mixed result, with procyclical R&D responding asymmetrically and negatively to demand shocks. In a follow-up paper, Ouyang (2010) constructs a model that suggests that R&D appears to be countercyclical with low credit constraints, but procyclical with sufficiently high credit constraints, whereas mixed cyclicality is displayed for a moderate degree of credit constraints. Her theory also claims that the Schumpeterian virtue of bad times holds only if the marginal opportunity cost of productivity-enhancing investments dominates the marginal expected return. Aghion et al. (2005) and Aghion et al. (2010) also provide empirical support for their model. Their analysis from a panel of twenty-one Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries shows that long-term growthenhancing investments respond less to positive exogenous shocks in countries with more developed financial sectors. Aghion et al. (2008) have also provided firm-level evidence for their model using a panel data set of French firms. They show a stronger positive correlation between sales and R&D spending in more credit-constrained firms. The credit-constrained firms also suffer more from demand volatility with an asymmetric effect on R&D investments, which become more harmed in slumps than they are encouraged in booms. Due to the asymmetric information problem, uncertain and lagged returns complicate R&D financing. Hall and Lerner (2010) suggest that financial markets underinvest in R&D projects and that capital costs are higher for R&D-intensive industries, especially for small and newly established firms. They also show that venture capital is not always a solution, as it requires a great deal of knowledge and experience from the fund management to finance the R&D sector. Even large and established firms tend to use their internal cash flows to finance R&D and innovation.
The effect of credit constraints on R&D and innovation is predominantly found to be negative (Aghion et al. 2008; Ouyang 2007 Ouyang , 2010 Savignac 2008 ).
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The unavailability of explicit information has given rise to indirect measures of financial constraints, such as sensitivity of investments to cash flows, firm size, age, credit rating, foreign ownership, and so forth. In a recent study Hadlock and Pierce (2010) argues that firms' age and size alone are good predictors of the level of financial constraints. Many studies argue in favor of a direct, self-assessed measure of financial constraints (Campello et al. 2010; Kaplan and Zingales 1997; Savignac 2008) . A firm-assessed financial constraint variable provides specific and new information about the financial problems encountered in a company beyond reflections on the global financial situation.
The papers by Efthyvoulou and Vahter (2012) , Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013) , and Savignac (2008) , are methodologically closest to our study. Although they focus on innovation rather than R&D, they also employ a direct measure of credit constraints and estimate firms' propensity to invest in innovation activities subject to endogenous financial constraints.
Data and Methodology
We employ firm-level data from BEEPS, conducted jointly by the EBRD and the World Bank. Three consecutive rounds of BEEPS (from 2002, 2005, and 2009 ) have been covered. The survey data are collected retrospectively, referencing 2001, 2004, and 2007 . The sample structure has been designed to be representative of the population of firms in each country. The survey does not cover firms operating in sectors under government regulation and prudential supervision, such as banking, electric power, rail transport, and water supply. Firms with only 1 employee or with more than 10,000 employees were also excluded.
3 In addition, we leave out firms with annual sales below EUR 50,000 and firms that have been in operation for less than three years.
The BEEPS covers a wide set of transition countries, and our analysis focuses on ten of the new EU member countries: the Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. EU accession means that these countries all have a similar institutional background, which supports our research design in terms of pooling the data of individual countries. The countries analyzed can be viewed as "catching-up" in terms of their economic performance compared to Western Europe or the United States, and according to Eurostat the gross domestic product (GDP) in purchasing power standards (PPS) per inhabitant was 1.7 times higher in the United States than in the richest country of our sample, Slovenia, in 2001-7. The CSEE region, however, remains diverse in terms of income, technological advancement, and financial-sector development. For example, according to Eurostat, the GDP PPS per inhabitant was 2.5 times higher in Slovenia than in the sample's poorest country, Romania.
The BEEPS is a rich data set, covering R&D and innovation activities, dependence on and access to external finances, and many standard firm characteristics. The variables used in this paper are described in Table 1 . R&D activity is measured as a binary variable, capturing whether the firm conducts R&D or not. This binary measurement of R&D activity should not significantly affect the effect of credit constraints on R&D, as credit constraints mostly affect the likelihood of a firm doing R&D and not the level of R&D investment (see Mancusi and Vezzulli 2010) .
Credit-constrained firms are those that do not have a loan because they claim not to be eligible to apply for it, or firms that have applied for credit but have been turned down by the bank. Firms are not credit constrained if they do not want to have a loan or if they have received a loan. We only conduct the analysis for creditdependent firms, which are those that use or want to use external finance, because credit constraints can only influence the R&D activity of these firms.
The demand shock has been proxied by three industry-level variables covering year-on-year growth in real value added, employment, and real turnover. The aggregation level of industries corresponds to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activity in the European Community (NACE) Rev.1.1 one-digit level, implying a limited effect from any single firm. Another argument supporting our choice of demand proxies is that supply shocks are more long term, meaning yearly changes in output mostly capture changes in demand. Asymmetric demand shock effects are accounted for by decomposing the demand variables into separate variables: for positive values showing growth and negative values showing decline. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. In total, 35 percent of sample firms do not use external financing, and the exclusion of those firms increases the share of credit-constrained firms from 13 percent to 20 percent. This exclusion alters somewhat the sample average firm size, age, growth, and R&D intensity. Another aspect relevant for the relationship between credit constraints and R&D stems from the group of firms that are not potential R&D investors, with or without credit constraints. Potential R&D firms are defined as firms that identify the pressure coming from domestic or foreign competitors or from customers to develop new products or reduce production costs as at least "fairly important." Table 3 indicates that this aspect is not of substantial magnitude in our case, as including only potential R&D firms increases the share of R&D firms by only 0.5 percentage point. Another relevant observation from We estimate a recursive bivariate probit model. The argument in favor of a recursive model is that financial constraints can be considered endogenous to R&D. Not only do the financial constraints have an impact on the likelihood of a firm conducting R&D, but the qualities that distinguish firms engaging in R&D also make them more attractive to creditors. Consider a recursive system with binary endogenous variables (Monfardini and Radice 2008) :
where y 1i stands for the presence of financial constraints, y 2i represents the likelihood of the firm conducting R&D; y * 1i
and y * 2i
are latent variables, while dichotomous variables are observed; b 1 and d 2 are parameter vectors; d 1 is a scalar parameter; and x 1i and z 2i are vectors of exogenous variables. The subindex i reflects firms, i = 1, ..., 6,387. The errors u 1i and u 2i are jointly normally distributed with zero mean, unit variance, and correlation of ρ. If ρ = 0, two separate probit models can be estimated, implying that y 1i is exogenous for the structural form equation. Source: Authors' calculations based on BEEPS and Eurostat data. Table 3 . 
R&D Cyclicality and Credit Constraints in CSEE Countries

Source:
Authors' calculations based on BEEPS data.
notes:
Bivariate probit conditional marginal effects of R&D, reported at Constrained = 1. Robust, country-sector-year clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Country dummies included in constraint equation and sector dummies in R&D equation. *** Statistical significance at the 1 percent level; ** statistical significance at the 5 percent level; * statistical significance at the 10 percent level.
Binary models in general are demanding in terms of sample sizes, more so in bivariate binary outcome models (Monfardini and Radice 2008 ). In our model the endogenous financial constraint is regressed with the following variables: (1) age, (2) and (3) firm size dummies, (4) public listing, (5) foreign ownership, (6) firm's sales growth, (7) overdue loans, (8) auditing, and (9) state subsidies. Country dummies are added to control for cross-country differences in institutions and credit deepening.
R&D is regressed, with the following variables overlapping with those of the credit constraints equation: (1) age, (2) and (3) firm size dummies, (4) public listing, (5) foreign ownership, (6) firm's sales growth. In addition it contains: (7) share of sales exported, (8) share of university graduates in workforce, and (8) industry demand proxy. In addition, sector dummies are included as R&D is concentrated in certain industries.
Results
R&D Cyclicality in CSEE Countries
We present the overall marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the propensity to undertake R&D and also disentangle the effect into the direct effect from the R&D equation and the indirect effect from the credit-constraint equation. The estimation outcome (see Table 3 ) implies that credit constraints have a strong and statistically significant adverse effect on the propensity of firms to undertake R&D. Credit-constrained firms undertake R&D 76-78 percent less frequently (pointestimates). This is a high marginal effect, as for example Savignac (2008) finds that credit-constrained firms undertake innovation 20 percent less frequently.
Larger, publicly listed, exporting firms, and firms with a more highly skilled workforce undertake R&D more frequently. The indirect effects on R&D from the credit-constraint equation are quite strong, and often have an opposite sign to the one in the R&D equation. For example mature firms are less credit constrained, but in general they are less inclined to undertake R&D. Foreign companies, which have better access to credit than do domestic companies, tend to do less R&D. Interestingly, the listed firms perceive higher credit constraints than nonlisted firms do, while being more engaged in R&D. Overdues (late payments to creditors), audits, and subsidies have strong indirect effects on R&D propensity. Firms with overdues are more credit constrained, and this reduces their R&D propensity by 5 to 6 percent, while the R&D propensity of audited firms increases by 5 percent and that of subsidized firms by 10 percent through relaxed credit constraints.
The sales growth of firms is crucial and elicits a statistically significant positive overall effect on R&D. A 10 percent increase in real sales is associated with a 0.7-0.8 percent increase in R&D propensity. This is a result of the indirect effect of relieved credit constraints, while the direct effect of sales growth on R&D is negative. The positive indirect effect shows that internal funds reduce credit con- straints and help in raising external funding for R&D projects, and that R&D is countercyclical to turnover growth, as predicted by the opportunity-cost argument. Hence, our estimates indicate that the methodology based on the bivariate probit model is unavoidable for this type of estimate, and that the procyclicality of R&D often observed by single regression estimations may capture only the indirect effect from credit constraints. The strong simultaneity of R&D and credit constraints is confirmed by the high correlation in the disturbance terms ρ.
The industry-level demand fluctuations also have a statistically significant effect on R&D. Interestingly, the statistically significant effect of industry demand manifests only when the asymmetry of the cycle is taken into account.
4 Table 4 shows that the cyclicality of R&D is different in recessions and booms. The opportunity-cost effect of R&D manifests during recessions, whereas mixed evidence is found for booms. This means that the "virtue of bad times" indeed proves to be true in CSEE countries.We have also tested for the possible selection bias arising from firms that rarely undertake any R&D projects or from firms that do not use external finance. The subsample of potentially innovative firms has, in absolute terms, only a slightly larger effect of constraint on the propensity to conduct R&D than does the sample total. Surprisingly, including credit-independent firms in our benchmark sample also has only a minor effect on the coefficient of credit constraints, while the estimates on the sample of credit-dependent firms show higher sensitivity to negative demand shocks. These results are available from the authors upon request.
R&D Cyclicality and Country's Level of Income
The observed countercyclicality of R&D has not always been confirmed in the literature, while the determinants behind the pro-or countercyclicality of R&D still remain puzzling. Therefore we also test whether the R&D cyclicality changes when a country's average income level increases. In order to test for the differences between more and less advanced countries, we introduce cycle and credit constraint interaction terms with GDP per capita in PPS. The results are presented in Table 4 .
Estimations show that the effect of credit constraints on the likelihood of a firm conducting R&D does not differ significantly (in a statistical sense) across higher-and lower-income countries. The interaction coefficients with industry demand proxies show that R&D countercyclicality falls as the country's level of development rises; five of the six interaction term coefficients have a positive sign, and three of them are statistically significant. Hence, the estimations suggest that the opportunity-cost postulate is more valid for firms operating in less advanced markets. Ouyang's (2010) theory might provide the explanation. She suggests that the cyclicality of R&D is driven by a trade-off between marginal opportunity cost and marginal expected return from R&D. Arguably, the closer the country is to the technological frontier, the higher are the expected returns from R&D relative to the opportunity costs of R&D, contributing to less volatile R&D. 
Source:
notes:
Summary
In our study, we have sought to fill the gap between a macroeconomic understanding of volatility and long-term growth on the one hand and the firm-level evidence of productivity-enhancing R&D on the other. We find that credit constraints have an adverse effect on R&D in CSEE countries. Controlling for credit constraints reveals that R&D in CSEE is countercyclical. The sales growth of firms has a direct negative effect on R&D, and an indirect positive effect, by mitigating the credit constraints on firms. Hence, the procyclicality of R&D in terms of firm sales growth, often found in the empirical literature, may be driven by alleviated credit constraints and not by firms' intention to concentrate on R&D during booms. The firms in the CSEE countries conducted more R&D during times of low industrylevel demand and less R&D in times of high industry-level demand. This evidence is in line with the opportunity-cost theory, suggesting that recessions force firms to focus on a productivity-enhancing agenda.
The comparison of CSEE countries by GDP per capita reveals that the opportunity cost-driven behavior is more evident in countries with a lower income level. The theory proposed by Ouyang (2010) might provide an explanation. Her model suggests that there is a trade-off between marginal opportunity cost and marginal expected return from R&D. Our interpretation is that more advanced economies that are closer to the technological frontier are more likely to have a higher expected return from R&D relative to opportunity costs. This conjecture is, however, a subject for further research. Further research is also needed to estimate the effect of expected returns and opportunity costs on R&D; similar studies on a panel of data are warranted to investigate the dynamics within firms over the cycles. 2. The reverse relationship, or the impact of R&D intensity on liquidity constraints, is also tested (e.g., see Piga and Atzeni 2007) .
3. See reports on the BEEPS methodology at www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/ surveys/beeps.shtml.
4. If the asymmetry of the cycle is not taken into account, industry-level growth usually has a small negative and statistically insignificant effect on R&D propensity. These results are available from the authors upon request.
